Irregular Regulations

Posted by Sanjeev Pandiya On Sunday, January 22, 2012

The need for a philosophy in Regulation Companies make Vision Statements that tell you (if they are honest) the broad direction that you can expect it to take. So an Apple Inc can be expected to focus on design, while a Samsung can be expected to focus on take-to-market. These Vision Statements usually come from deliberate Planning efforts, which is often called ‘Strategic Planning’. The outcome of these Planning exercises, is that there is an explicit statement of ‘strategy’, which is like a positioning statement for the co, a statement of aspiration for a ‘state of being’. Even countries have something like that. India has a Constitution and ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’, which give a deliberate structure to the direction of actions taken by the State. Have you ever wondered why the people who regulate these companies, don’t consider it necessary to let their subjects (and the general public) know where they are headed? Let’s take an example. When TRAI or IRDA are given their mandate over their respective industries, do they lay out a ‘Constitution’ that binds their own behavior and a Statement of Strategic Intent that lays out just what Utopia they are looking for. These statements can be changed from time to time, but they should be clear & transparent. It should be binding on the regulator to demonstrate, by every action of his, that he has kept in mind his objective while formulating a regulatory stance or taking some regulatory action. At a much wider level, you will discipline various arms of Govt from ‘playing to the gallery’ by pandering to media frenzy, which sets up these lynch mobs that destroy reputations. And you will bring some predictability and consistency to regulatory action. Let us take a very small example. The move to shift Currency Trading to an exchange-traded format, was part of the movement towards full Currency convertibility. It accelerated after the Fx Derivatives ‘scam’, in which a large number of small companies were (mis)sold complex OTC derivatives, with structures that increased risk rather than reducing them. During the 2008 crisis, most of these structures unraveled, causing huge losses and even bankruptcies among SMEs. Justifiably, the RBI took it upon itself to tighten the screws on this ‘business’ and put a stop to these bilateral transactions in exotic derivative structures. Through a slew of circulars and guidelines, it made life difficult for the foreign and private banks that were preying on the SMEs. Meanwhile, the door was thrown open for exchange- traded vanilla products, which became increasingly liquid, thanks to retail participation. As the currency exchanges gained volumes and market share, a minor argument ensued over who should regulate these currency exchanges. Were these formats more to do with ‘currency’ or did they have more to do with ‘exchanges’. Because traditionally, exchanges had been regulated by SEBI, while currencies, naturally, had more to do with the Central Bank. The matter was resolved in favour of SEBI, probably with reason. Meanwhile, things improved rapidly for those SMEs who understood both trading formats and international economics. The first good thing was that ‘underlying’ was no longer needed, everybody could trade and you could hedge, speculate, invest or trade, regardless of whether you were exporter, importer or neither. This promoted genuine price discovery with depth and liquidity appropriate to a money market. ‘Underlying’ is a FERA-era regulation, under which exporters/ importers have to prove that they have a ‘genuine’ trade transaction ‘underlying’ the hedging transaction they are undertaking with the banks. Otherwise, you were ‘speculating’, a bad word in Indira Gandhi’s time. Those days, foreign exchange was ‘precious’ and the buying of any foreign exchange was seen as a one-way bet against the Rupee. The regulation continues today, nobody knows why. Sometimes I think that the RBI very smartly uses this (regulation) as a tool to push corporates to trade on the currency exchanges, rather than deal bilaterally with the banks. Eventually, when enough corporates are forced onto the exchanges, the banks will follow, deepening the market. Meanwhile, regulations about ‘underlying’ are tightened, forcing mid-corporates out of the bank (trading) market. Needless to say, there is no question of any exotic derivatives being traded any more. Meanwhile, SEBI and the exchanges did a good job, pushing liquidity and promoting currency trading with good risk management practices and low impact costs. However, SEBI carried into this new product, its equity trading mindset and continues to regulate the currency markets as if it is still regulating an equity-like instrument. For example, it continues with ‘market concentration’ limits in currency markets, as if it was possible to ‘corner’ all the currency in the country. Believe it or not, the market concentration limit on a major currency like the Euro and the Yen is about € 5 mn, and ¥ 2 mn respectively. As background, it is understandable for SEBI to be obsessed by ‘market concentration’. Its very existence was triggered by the Harshad Mehta scam, which was all about cornering shares of companies (sometimes in collusion with the promoters of those companies) with money siphoned out from Banks through the securities trading market. Both segments of these (exchange-traded) markets ended up under SEBI regulation and led to the development of electronic exchanges. Then came the Ketan Parekh scam, which was almost exclusively about the ‘KP10’companies. This was nothing but cartelization, in collusion with company promoters. Thereafter, SEBI has been dealing with cartelization and market rigging, either through P-notes masquerading as ‘FII’ investment or through ‘persons acting in concert’ in high- promoter- stake companies. So it is understandable if it carries a paranoid mindset about ‘market concentration’ into its regulation of currency markets. However, the key underlying premise in ‘market concentration’ is a limitation on the ability to create supply. In some cases, companies were accused of putting out duplicate shares into a very ‘hot’ market, in effect short-selling their own stock with fake currency. But in currency markets, this pernicious activity is done by the regulator itself (and goes by the respectable name of Deficit Financing). So how can a poor trader ever be able to ‘corner’ a currency? In India, as in most countries of the world, the Central Bank routinely intervenes in Fx markets, creating money supply at one extreme end of the market. That takes the effect of ‘reducing volatility’ and is seen as honourable activity; but isn’t that what jobbers do? By the simple expedient of telling a PSU bank to monitor the exchange-traded markets, the Govt can ensure that price differences between the Bank market and the exchanges do not exceed a certain maximum. In any case, some banks are already doing that through their Prop Trading desks. In any case, can they (RBI and SEBI) see how they are working at cross purposes, simply because they have different objectives and hence, different mindsets. RBI, very justifiably, is clear that SMEs (and later maybe big corporates) must operate on the currency exchanges. Hence, it is gently but firmly pushing smaller corporates out of the Bank markets. It will probably now ask the Banks to shift their Prop Trading volumes onto the currency markets; I have not understood why it has not done so (maybe because enhancing liquidity in currency markets is not its objective). Finally, when there is enough depth and liquidity (currency markets’ turnover has already reached $7 bn, out of a total of about $50-60 bn, i.e. about 10%), it will close down the bilateral Bank/ OTC market. This has had the ‘unintended consequence’ of bringing in day traders from the Equity/ Commodity markets, who like the huge liquidity and low volatility of the currency markets, as compared to the equity markets. They particularly like the periodic RBI intervention, which cools down one-way movements and gives them an exit if they get something seriously wrong. When a currency trader hits her stop loss, she can at least find an exit. So HNIs and jobbers have started to populate the market. But what does SEBI do? It puts on its Equity regulators’ hat, and sets ‘market concentration’ limits that ensure that big jobbers (and later, bigger corporates and the banks) DON’T enter the market. What is the objective of this? It achieves precisely the opposite of the regulators’ original objective. Can you see how one (regulator) works against the other?

The Alligators In The Moat

Posted by Sanjeev Pandiya On Sunday, January 22, 2012

When Perception Does Not Equal Performance Investing is a complex business, not in the elucidation of the rules, or even their implementation, but in outlining/ knowing/ anticipating and providing for the exceptions to the rules. New writing by philosophers like NassimTaleb spends considerable time in pointing out the “black swans” that we mostly do not look out for, and how they can derail the best strategies. Counter-intuitively, a strategy that constantly looks out for the Black Swan, even without much idea of what it looks like, will be more successful. But we are here to sit in judgement on Warren Buffet’s prescription to ‘buy a business with a moat’. In an earlier, simpler world, it made sense to pick up a ‘simple’ business that was ‘simple’ because it was doing something very right, and was expected to keep doing it for a very long time. The customer paid for any mistakes, and the business ‘chose’ to ‘keep it simple, stupid’ by looking away from a whole lot of initiatives that had the possibility of going wrong. The obvious examples of Warren’s principle are Coke and American Express, and we look at both these examples in light of new experience. Coke, for example, had a long stretch of high Free Cash Flows, which were duly reinvested to finance further high-profit growth, till the return (after compounding for a long time) on the original capital looked unbelievable. But that was in a steady, domestic-oriented growth market, that grew as part of the American consumption story. Today, even Coke’s business is vastly more complex with threats, both technological/ behavioural and international, peppered all over their business case. You can, of course, punt/ pray that good management will ride out any potholes in the Coke story, but it might be a better idea to watch carefully…which is why ‘buy and hold’ is not such a bright idea any more. Coke now faces threats in India that it could not have ever imagined, and its famous ‘moat’ is now full of holes, exposing many sleeping alligators. The same goes for Amex, which once had the admonition, “don’t leave home without it”……well, it would seem that new Asia, which is where the growth is, is certainly leaving their homes without it. And America, which is the market that gave Amex its famous moat, is leaving it at home now… In the same breath that Warren laid out this principle, another Warren-lookalike, Tweedy Browne, gave this investing principle a grainy structure by talking about a “Competitive Advantage Period” (CAP). This was later used by Copeland and Currim when they laid out their principles of DCF analysis, in which they talked about the “terminal value” of a business, with a facile assumption of steady, uninterrupted and perpetual growth at a certain rate. Today, look at Coke/ Amex and tell me what their ‘terminal value’ is. Both have faced blind alleys in emerging markets, lost market share in home markets and faced falling ROCE. The moats they built, which looked so impregnable in the American market dominated by a Baby Boomer generation, fell by the wayside before Chindia’s Generation Y. The examples I have used are across markets, US vs Emerging Asia. That is only because I have chosen Warren’s own companies and the moats HE bought. The same, however, is equally true across time, where (much more spectacularly) the Competitive Advantage Period turns out to be much shorter than anticipated. In 20 years, Hindustan Lever has gone from a company that could do no wrong, to a pedestrian company that is actually rated as ‘risky’ by traders, because of its periodic bursts of underperformance. Somebody who paid 60 times earnings for this company in 1990, would not have earned as much as even the Sensex. The point is not whether HLL was a good investment; but that the ‘moat’ that you paid for, turned out to have a lot of alligators (called Nirma, P & G, Ghadi). Anticipating and monitoring these ‘alligators’ would have got you much better entry (and exit) points as a trader, than the static buying of ‘moats’. You know, there is no substitute for hard work… To repeat, moats ‘leak’, they decay over time and they have a lot of alligators, who have to be negotiated. Sometimes, if you can anticipate a “David” alligator in time (like CavinKare, who took on Goliath HLL), it makes more sense to invest in the alligator than in the moat. Today’s world has a lot of discontinuous threats, and it makes sense to invest in discontinuity as a phenomenon. I would modify Warren Buffet’s rule a bit: in the Indian context, look for a moat, but don’t pay for it. Sounds difficult? And yet, in these same columns, I told you about Bharti when it was trading at 255-320; in hindsight, it turned out to be a huge bear-market outperformer, rising 20%+ in a market that fell by the same margin. Right now, Tata Steel, one of the lowest-cost producers of steel in the world, is available at 5-6 times earnings, or 1.2 times Book Value 1-year Fwd. This, with a bear market RONW of 22%. Using the same logic, this same stock has gone to Rs.1000+, then down to Rs.150, so you have obviously had both kinds of buyers, those who paid for the moat (and got an alligator called Corus, instead) and those who didn’t. DLF, if you can stomach real estate, has Lease Rental income worth nearly Rs.2000 cr for a Market Cap of Rs.30,000cr (i.e. 15 times its rental income, or 6%). That is like buying property; the rest of the Operating Business is free. With Rs.414 per share in the Land Bank, they only need 50% premium over the land value to generate enough cash to retire the entire debt, leaving behind the rental income as profit. How is that for a moat that you didn’t pay for? Why do you think it just won’t fall below Rs.210 (till you, my dear readers, start buying, so be warned!!!)? The world has got just too complex for a simplistic, “buy and hold” strategy that allows you, the investor, to go to sleep. Hardly any business is able to outperform the cost of capital over a sufficiently long enough period of time, to recover the ‘cost of the moat’ paid by a lazy investor. Like I pointed out, it is the sellers of the moats who make the money, not the users. So what works? That would take much more than this column, this is just a counter-view to remind you of what doesn’t work (anymore). If you get into one of the Infra stocks sitting on a good concession (like Noida Toll Bridge), or GMR and the moat does not take too long in coming up, you might do well. The right time to ask yourself this question, is shortly after a huge fragmentation of the industry (like in steel, power and infrastructure just now, and telecom a while back). At this point, look for those who are still generating enough Free Cash Flow to repay debt, and ride the debt reduction programme. This was the common thing between Bharti a year back, Tata Steel just now, and DLF, maybe 1 year from now…once you start to see the debt mountain come off, start buying and you will hopefully see yourself sitting on a moat you haven’t paid for. Remember, debt repayment is deflationary, i.e. it reduces incremental returns and sends the stock into a long, slow decline. Timing the bottom is difficult and nerve-wracking, but the rewards are for the long-term. But buying Brittania before the fragmentation of the biscuit market, HLL before P & G came around, or Raymond before the waves of apparel retailers came on, is like buying a moat while the drawbridge is down. Moats are what moats do, not what they look like……a good moat would be pumping cash through a downturn, paying down debt and funding growth in an unattractive business. The latter may be the last giveaway indicator of a real moat…! Disclaimer:The author has large positions in Futures Contracts of Tata Steel and DLF.

A Factory Called The Euro

Posted by Sanjeev Pandiya On Sunday, January 22, 2012

The Logic of Carry Trades Think of it as a factory, or an SBU. The advantage over a physical factory is that our investment can be retrieved with very short notice; hence short-term (Working Capital) funds can be used to fund such activities. This would be a factory without any labour costs, any strikes and lockouts, no big Accounts and Admn Departments, no big offices (or even physical factories). Yet it produces a return in the same way that a factory does. It is superior to a factory, because you can vary the amount invested based on your appetite. If you need money for a house, just reduce your positions; you don’t have to sell your ‘factory’. Most important, is the process of growth. Like any factory, you make money after you start to do things right, relative to the market. However, in case of a factory, most businesses hit the rough when they set out to grow, i.e. set up the next factory. Here, they face a set of completely new variables, new skills and a whole new set of risks altogether. Since a company does not get many opportunities to set up a factory, it does not have much mistake-proofing built into its Project Management processes. And this is where many companies make grievous mistakes, leading to either a broken leg or even a broken neck. In fact, this is why the Capex cycle is synonymous with a Business Cycle. So what if I offered you a ‘business’ that is ‘frictionless’, i.e. it has no costs, no people, no strikes/ lockouts, no transport/ logistics breakdowns. There is no ‘project’ phase, during which the business has to go through trial runs, absorb spikes in material wastage, or find new customers for its additional production (or suffer extra warehousing and inventory-carrying charges while it waits for Business Development to deliver orders). Growth is also frictionless, i.e. there is no cost, no dislocation and no faltering in the business during the scale-up. Here is what you do. Look for a low-interest currency. Usually, interest rates are low where the savings rate is high, like in the JPY. But once in a while, you get low Interest Rates with low savings, like is being done by the US and European Central Banks just now.  The Economic Argument: the Forward Curve is related to the Interest Rate differential between any 2 currencies, after adjusting for the expected direction in Interest Rates over the foreseeable future. ‘Carry traders’ move money from one currency to another, betting on the fact that they will get higher Interest rates in the currency bought. Often, the relative levels of Inflation in the 2 currencies also impacts the Forward Curve, provided real interest rates remain the same or move in a narrow range. When this is not true, the Forward Curve gets disproportionately steep. Since real interest rates are a function of country risk, they reflect risk premia. If real interest rates are high, and risk premia are also high, it follows that the Equity Risk premium will be higher, reflecting in low Market P-E. That makes the country a better investment bet in Equities. In case of the Euro, for example, interest rates are low, despite a low savings rate because of Central Bank intervention AND the fact that a sluggish domestic economy has little room for any credit growth. This makes it a candidate for a ‘carry trading’/ funding currency, i.e. borrow in Euro at 1.25%, lend in the Rupee at 8%. At the end of the year, sell the Rupees and when you go to buy the Euro, it should have not appreciated much. An appreciating Euro will hurt Greek and Portuguese exports, widening their Current Account Deficit, thus bringing the Euro back to square one. Certainly, the Euro looks unlikely to appreciate 6.75% per year, ad infinitum.  The Traders’ Argument: volatility and volumes are good, even as the high-low band remains relatively small, and the number of one-way movements has been limited. If you use a technique of “rupee cost averaging”, you would be selling at all levels and buying back at all levels. This strategy presupposes that the sum total of all candlesticks is many times (>20) the actual risk of loss (a.k.a. maximum possible loss, i.e Value at Risk, VaR). Hence, you stand to lose, say, Rs.100, but you recover say, about Rs.500 from all the systematic trading that you do. It all looks (and sounds) very complicated, and the really interested reader might want to read this a few times over. But at its root, it is an Insurance company operation, i.e. there is a premium flow receivable every time you write a policy. Even though a lot of people are involved in finding the customer/ insurer, capturing the Insurance premiaand servicing claims, that is NOT the reason an insurance co makes money. You can do away with all this, and still make as much (if not more) money than the Insurance co; it is called (buying and selling) reinsurance, which is nothing but trading of income streams with probabilistic claims attached to it. At the net level, you are buying a series of positive and negative outflows for an NPV. Assume that over a period of time, these positive and negative flows cancel each other out, leaving a ‘net return’ that meets the cost of capital. But the return is lumpy, i.e. there are periods of high profitability followed by periods of sharp losses. Cut to the rest of the real world. The same thing happens in all markets. In the cyclical sugar industry, the turnover may be more or less equally spread over 4 years, but the profits come 60% in 1 year, 30% in another year, 20% in a 3rd year, and the 4th year carries a loss. This causes a huge variation in a traders’ income stream, but if he can avoid the sharp price corrections that take place at the top of the cycle, he can make big returns over the rest of the cycle. If you can sell a low-interest rate currency close to the top of its movement, you have actually ‘bought’ the high-interest (and savings deficit) currency. In the case above, you borrow from Euro at 1.25% and ‘lend’ to India at 8%, getting a 6.25% currency differential in the process. This ‘carry’ is nothing but the Forward Curve, visible over a year. In the Indian currency markets, it is the ‘rollover premia’, which you get, against which you have to provide for a ‘claim’, i.e. the probability that the Euro will appreciate. Now, through the economic arguments articulated above, we know that there is little logic for the euro to appreciate, so the probability of claim for a long period of time is low. Oh yes, there will be short spikes, which will have to be funded, but since they reverse quickly, your carrying cost is low. Look back at 2002, and you will see the $:: Re at Rs.42. If someone had sold it then, and carried a short for the last 9 years, he would have earned about Rs.21 in ‘carry’, And the $ is back at more or less the same level; so the strategy does work over the very long-term. For any individual who is willing to work hard and understand all this, you can build your own Insurance co, which will be far more profitable than almost any company in India. You are able to build a Pension Plan that outperforms almost any scheme sold to you by these big institutions. If you are a company, you get to outperform your industry by a mile. According to one of the Berkshire Annual Reports, this (reinsurance) strategy is the real reason for their ‘negative cost of capital’, and contributes more to their cumulative outperformance than their long-term Investment Return of 23%. The reason for this is simple: a negative cost of capital allows you to theoretically take unlimited leverage. The more your leverage, the more you earn. And the leverage is self-liquidating. If your effective cost of capital is MINUS 4%, the returns from this leverage will automatically take your leverage to zero in about 10-15 years. Do the math, and you will shock yourself. Companies that believe that low leverage is an unmitigated virtue, have obviously not understood this. That the Master of Capital Returns (Warren Buffet) is actually a fine practitioner of the art of leverage…even as he extolls the virtues of low leverage to those who don’t understand ‘negative cost of capital’.

Core Competence

Posted by Sanjeev Pandiya On Sunday, January 22, 2012

The Case Against Diversification What is the first piece of ‘investment wisdom’ that the self-appointed experts teach you? Hold many eggs in many baskets, because you don’t know which egg (or which basket) is bad. The argument for making a portfolio out of everything is repeated so often that its echo is often confused as the prevailing wisdom. Yet, when we talk about real businesses, we now make the exact opposite argument, i.e. focus on your Core Competence. The underlying assumption is that for a business to be competitive, it must have scale, intelligence/ knowledge/ data (about costs and revenues) and enough perspective/ wisdom/ philosophy/ know-why in all its business processes, to ensure that it outperforms competition. There are few activities that require perspective, as much as Investing. If markets are a mechanism for the “transfer of wealth from the foolish (many) to the intelligent (few)”, then the meaning of these words has to be carefully spelt out. Investing, then, is at least as much about having intelligence, as it is about having any money (to invest) in the first place. Thereafter, the principle of compounding tells us that Intelligence/ perspective plays a disproportionate role in deciding who wins the investment sweepstakes. Warren Buffet tells you to “buy a part of the business, and thereafter, to own your shares like you own a business”. He dwells on these aspects at length, and then goes on to tell you that “the best time to sell a good investment is never”. Indirectly, he is also bringing out the principles of Core Competence. For example, blind diversification for its own sake, is just that….blind!!! If you don’t know what you are doing, you are more likely to step into a puddle if you walk on many roads. As any blind person will tell you, the best way to ‘see’ where you are going, is to get a sense of a place by doing repeated passes down the same road. Jobbers often look like day traders, and have unfairly been given a bad name, all of them being painted with the same tarred brush. Some of the best jobbers will stick to the same stock for a lifetime, actually adhering to Warren Buffet’s advice of never actually leaving a stock, even as they buy and sell stock many times during a day. Not only do they add liquidity to the stock, they have local insights about the price discovery prevailing in a stock, its different ‘moods’ and its penchant for surprise, that outsiders will never have. This is perspective, something the stereotypical day trader does not have. Investors get paid to identify trends; they make money when they (correctly) anticipate a trend. Markets are a discounting mechanism, and the winners are those who forecast accurately, and then put their money behind a hypothesis. If any of these 3 are missing (i.e. the forecast, the money or the hypothesis), you don’t make money. The hangers-on, i.e. the pundits, sit on the sidelines and pass comment on the players. They are about as right as any cricket fan, about whether Sachin will carry India to victory or not. And their winning odds are similar. So ‘diversify’; they say, but against what? If you don’t articulate the risks you are facing, what are you diversifying against? The gullible investor is actually buying ‘Hope’ and as we all know, “Hope is not a strategy”. The cost of buying Hope is the actually the cost of buying randomness, and variability and unpredictability in investment returns. And most important, if you don’t know what you did right, then you have no hope of ever being able to repeat it. The pundits will tell you that your winners will make up for your losers, and that is the purpose of diversification. But if you don’t know (and don’t learn) how to tell one from the other, you have to live with the general belief that most stocks go up in the long run, often articulated as “market returns”. This, as we know, from recent experience, is not true over long stretches of time, and (you know from personal experience) is not the experience of most retail investors. However, this opinion (that markets go up in the long run) is prone to take widespread root in a late bull market, and shortly thereafter, is seen to be in the breach. Ironically, poor timing kills the people who claim to ignore market timing. Over the last 5 months, you could have been bought low Beta stocks (like Bharti, Power Grid Corpn), sold high Beta stocks (like Real Estate, Banks), bought the Dollar (against the Rupee) and sold the Euro (against the Rupee), bought Silver and sold Gold. Most of the positions would have worked out; to the uninitiated, this would look like diversification, but it is actually the same Investment Hypothesis, the same forecast. It may have been articulated over different instruments, but the underlying economic logic is unified. The same way, in 2007-08, you could have bought a low Beta stock like Hero Honda, sold a high Beta stock like DLF, bought the Dollar (against the Rupee), sold the Dollar (against JPY), bought Gold and sold the broad market. If you diversify blindly, you might get some legs right by accident, but you would be most likely to get enough legs wrong, to ensure that you destroy value. With the right economic arguments, you may choose to articulate it with one instrument or 10, that in itself is irrelevant. If your method of building your Investment Hypothesis is flawed, you have no hope….rather like the novice skydiver who took along 3 parachutes instead of one, but forgot to learn how to open them. Without the underlying knowledge, the ‘diversification’ is bound to lead to disaster. How about telling the novice to eschew skydiving till he learns enough about it? Novices should not be investing, they should be saving, generating capital, and if they MUST diversify, they can always buy 2-year Bank Fixed Deposits along with a 1-year Bank Fixed Deposit. If you know how to articulate an Investment Hypothesis, diversification is actually “di-worse-ification”, i.e. it means that you are investing in the probability that you are wrong. The way to manage that is through hard work and better diligence, not through diversification. If it turns out that you did a good job, you will actually reduce your Investment Returns, not your Risk. It is when you don’t know which way the trend is going (i.e. you don’t know Investing), that you say it through ‘diversification’…….I don’t know, and I am just hoping!!! Which brings me to the idea of ‘buy and hold’, another canard floating around the Investment markets. When we buy a stock, we are actually buying a business, whose returns over the long-term are linked to the fortunes of the business. Now, Business Risk is complex, has many aspects and there are many of them. Even the people running the business don’t have a full grip on all the risks in that business, and cannot tell you, for example, how much they will make (and why) in, say, 5 years. Why then, would ‘buy and hold’ be such a good idea? Just because you don’t know any better, and the pundits you trust don’t know either? How about trying to figure out the volatility (of price discovery) in a stock? It is difficult and complex, perhaps, but it saves you the effort of trying to understand the long term prospects of the sector, for example. It is much easier to buy a telecom stock when everybody is decided that “Telecom is an underperformer”, and then try to figure out the patterns in the stock, i.e. buy the stock when the rollover cost is negative and sell it when the rollover cost crosses 1% per month. Try figuring out the rest of the business….which way will 3G go, what effect will Cloud Computing have on Telecom, which African country is going up in flames, who is the new Minister in Telecom, what new social network is emerging among kids (and is it a threat to, or opportunity for, Telecom), and which new industry is going to come out of nowhere to suddenly replace existing technologies in Telecom? To those who say, ‘just buy a mediocre management in a great business, rather than good management in bad business’, make sure that you define ‘good business’ well. Is soft drinks a great business, and is Coke a great co? And if it is (a great company), is it also a great stock? Depends on when you catch it. Market timers might choose to look for an irrational seller, who gives away great value because of a weaker moment. Those who choose to ignore timing, are saying that the company’s business performance will be adequate to create value, i.e. the greatness of the business is a replacement for the lack of skill on the part of the investor. Because the company works hard, you (the investor) don’t have to…!!!

An Accountant’s Budget

Posted by Sanjeev Pandiya On Sunday, January 22, 2012

The Books Tally, But Little Else Does For a columnist who focuses more on philosophy than on analysis, this is an unusual column. The media seems not to have noticed the Govt’s accounting legerdemain, embedded in the Budget. It is a ‘paralysed’ Budget, with no major change in direction, although there are some pious platitudes in the fine print. And that is the saving grace, because in pursuance of those objectives, the Govt can kick off some major reforms during the course of the year, whenever it gets terrified enough to do so. Whether it will or not, has nothing to do with the thought process invested in the Budget (which seems to have been minimal), but will, as always, be a reaction to subsequent events (maybe the State elections coming up later this year). Figs in Rs. Cr. FY11 Budget Estimates FY11 Revised Estimates Delta % FY12 Budget Estimates Growth % Corporate Tax 301,300 296,400 (1.6%) 360,000 21.5% Income Tax 120,600 149,100 23.6% 172,000 15.4% Service Tax 68,000 69,400 2.1% 82,000 18.2% Customs 115,000 131,800 14.6% 151,700 15.1% Excise Duty 132,000 137,800 4.4% 164,100 19.1% Others Taxes 9800 2500 (74.7%) 2600 5.7% Gross Tax 746,700 786,900 5.4% 932,400 18.5% Source: Budget Papers Let us look at the illogic in the accounting numbers. GDP growth rate is projected at 9%, a slight improvement over last year. As the accountants say, “as per last”…! I can’t quarrel with that number yet, because you have to start somewhere. Inflation seems to be assumed at 5%, because the growth in nominal GDP is taken at 14% (the difference can only be Inflation). So tax revenue growth is assumed to be 18.5%, assuming a small uptick in tax compliance, I suppose. How did we do last year? On a nominal GDP growth of ~20.3% (8.3% real and 12% Inflation), tax revenues grew 25.9%. To assume that tax revenue growth will outstrip nominal GDP growth is only fair if you know the composition of Inflation. For example, last years’ tax revenue growth includes Customs Duty growth of 58.2% (in a year when the Current Account Deficit went to 4.1%). Is a repeat performance likely? The Inflation last year came from food prices, and agriculture does not contribute anything to taxes, so we cannot assume that high Inflation (especially if it comes from Food Inflation) leads to higher tax revenue growth. This year, the Budget Papers seem to have the facile assumption that Inflation will print in at 5%, no idea how. Implicitly, a fantastic monsoon is assumed, with somehow, low energy prices followed up with low commodity inflation. Given the background of erratic weather patterns, an inflamed Middle East and a resurgent US, I don’t see how global inflation will suddenly cool down to achieve anything close to such a number. And if Customs Duty growth does not help, how will you achieve such a steep tax revenue growth? Just because people will be nice to you….?! Remember: non-tax revenues like Telecom Licence Fees, which pushed revenues 89% last year, are expected to drop 43%, despite targets of Rs.16,000cr from FM Licences and Telecom Fees. I don’t think anybody is expecting a bonanza this year, unless some stiff fee is levied on the scam-tainted Telecom cos. The Tax:: GDP ratio is assumed at 10.4%, slightly below the peak rate achieved, i.e. 11.9% in 2007-08. That was a boom year for corporate profitability. And what is the market outlook for corporate profitability this year, if the Sensex is hitting YTD lows a day ahead of the Budget? It all depends on the composition of Inflation; if it is made up of a sudden increase in pricing power for manufacturers, then so be it. But if Inflation comes from high energy and even higher food prices, I don’t see the Tax :: GDP ratio going up. Quite the reverse: if Inflation starts to hurt, there will be a drop in tax compliance. So one of these things is going to fail you: either the GDP growth rate, or Inflation or tax revenue growth. The net result: the Fiscal deficit will not come in at 4.6%, unless you count the capital receipts coming from PSU divestment (Rs.40,000cr). This number has always failed us, and given the prevailing market sentiment, I don’t see how it is going to be achieved. Any shortfall will only add to the Fiscal Deficit. Let us now take a look at the expenditure side. This is where the Budget assumptions lose further credibility. Last year, Inflation ran at 10+%, and expenditure increased at 18.7%. This year, Inflation, by the Govt’s own projections is expected at an optimistic 5%, and the Govt is projecting expenditure growth of only 3.4%. With Plan expenditure still growing at 11.8%, the Govt actually expects non-Plan expenditure to contract by 0.7%, mainly because of lower provisioning for subsidies. Figs in Rs. Cr. Major Subsidies FY11 Budget Estimates FY11 Revised Estimates Delta % FY12 Budget Estimates Growth % Food 55,600 60,600 9.0% 60,600 0.0% Fertilisers 50,000 55,000 10.0% 50,000 (9.1%) Petroleum 3100 38,400 1135.1% 23,600 (38.4%) Interest Subsidies 4400 5200 18.3% 6900 31.5% Other Subsidies 3100 5000 58.2% 2500 (49.9%) Total Subsidies 116,200 164,200 41.2% 143,600 (12.5%) Source: Budget Papers Now make of this, what you will. In a year when the Food Security Bill is to be passed, Food Subsidiesare actually going to be constant. So obviously, you should not be surprised when Fertiliser Subsidy actually drops 9.1%, or Other Subsidies, which grew 58.2% last year, actually drop a whopping 49.9%. And either some very big policy change is round the corner in Petroleum, or this is plain obfuscation, because the bulk of the expenditure drop comes from this assumption. If you are going to acquire 65MT of foodgrains during the year, it will raise Food Subsidies by at least Rs.20,000cr; that alone will put you back at last years’ level. And if the oil gods are not kind to India (and I see no reason for them to be otherwise), I don’t see why the Fiscal Deficit will not come in higher. Which makes Inflation targeting, the main theme of the Budget, the first casualty. By no stretch of the imagination is this a path-breaking Budget that even sets a direction towards reforms, unless you believe the stuff about Petroleum Subsidies. If the Subsidy is actually withdrawn, oil prices at the pump will rise dramatically, and that itself will affect Inflation. How can you then assume such low Inflation? So what do you make of the other long-term promises, like Manufacturing to go to 25% of GDP. It seems like just a wish statement, with little substance or strategy embedded in the Budget. I had much hope that something would be done for investment in agriculture, other than sops. In particular, the nexus between clean energy, water management and agriculture would be recognised and we would get some hint of a Big Bang reform in that area, either a skeletal framework for the entry of corporates, or some new regulations to liberalise long-term land leases. There are some unimaginative sops to Clean Energy, LED Lighting and Solar, but no clear strategy emerges in this critical area. Quite simply, a Budget going nowhere, unless the Govt has some positive surprises in store for us later in the year. This Prime Minister has done it before, and I can’t seem to give up hoping. In particular, if the expenditure control is contained because of fundamental and structural reforms in an election year, we might just see a counter-intuitive movement of opinion from a scam-tainted Govt to a governance-focused, reform-oriented party and Govt. People WANT to believe. Mr. Singh has done it before and can do it again. Whether he will or not, only 2 people in this country will know….

Hoist With Its Own Petard

Posted by Sanjeev Pandiya On Sunday, January 22, 2012

An Update on the Telecom Sector In May, 2010, I did a columnhttp://www.valueresearchonline.com/story/h2_storyView.asp?str=14788, where I examined the recommendations of TRAI, and showed my readers how, it was impossible to achieve a fragmentation of the industry without resorting to unfair means. My column predated the breakout of the 2G Scam, which has hogged headlines for the last few months. It might be useful to read that article, to understand how the industry will evolve now. The TRAI Recommendations: it is now clear that they will be watered down, one by one. In May, 2010, TRAI had suggested that telcos pay market rates (based on 3G auction prices) for 2G spectrum at the time of licence renewal. At these prices, the licence renewal would have cost the big telcos Rs.20,000cr each; the new proposals floated by TRAI have already brought the bill down to half that amount. While this itself is a relief, it remains unfair and the telcos will protest it. The unfairness comes from the assumption that a price discovered in times of artificial scarcity (and post the 2G Scam, we know why), should be used to benchmark licence renewal fees and spectrum allocation in an environment that is now far easier. While the proposal for making spectrum tradeable is progressive, what they will find, after implementing the guideline, is that prices of spectrum will drop steeply, because on the selling side will be the numerous scam-tainted cos who have no customers, and on the buy side, is a set of very limited buyers with very limited purchasing power. The artificial scarcity of spectrum will have gone, and I won’t be surprised if prices even collapse. Remember, 3G spectral efficiency is 2.7X time 2G, so the spectrum needed for the same traffic will have dropped substantially. Already, one co seems to have realized that, because they have approached the Supreme Court with an offer to return the spectrum and the licences, if they can get back the Licence Fee they paid to the DoT. And the deafening silence of the DoT on this request, seems to indicate that they know this to be true. The proposal to cap spectrum seems to have been given a quiet burial. In any case, it would not have stood up to scrutiny in the courts, and is so blatantly seen as punishing the successful telcos, that it would have created a public backlash. As an aside, for those who are interested, it brings out the unfairness of the scam for the leading telcos. You fight a battle for the brand/customer and win fairly, based on superior customer service/ experience, etc. Then an artificial scarcity of your most important raw material (spectrum) is created, and that now-rare commodity is siphoned away to johnny-come-latelys, who are seeking a free ride into an industry that has already been opened up, and where latent customer demand is now unhooked. Shockingly, they discover that it takes much more than free spectrum to win the customer, and after entry, they find that the rest of the battle for the customer’s pocket is still way beyond their means. They bleed white, and chastened, they are happy to be given euthanasia. Really like the burglar, who picks the lock of the tijori/ Treasury, only to find that he has mistakenly stumbled into a snake pit… That leaves MNP, which came with a bang and went out with a whimper. The limited data coming from MNP is showing that the big telcos have superior networks, so there is no ‘hoarding’ of spectrum. The same coswhich are behind on rollout obligations, are anyway scam-tainted, have hoarded unnecessary spectrum and have kicked off the irrational pricing, are the biggest losers in MNP. The verification of subscriber bases has shown up these cos to be fudging numbers to corner spectrum again. If all this spectrum is taken over and released to those networks that have the subscribers, network quality will increase dramatically. That leaves only one more renegade proposal, which could hit this beleaguered industry. TRAI wants that every MHz above 6.2 MHz be priced at Rs.1769.75 cr. This is to put the bigger telcos at a cost disadvantage, simply because they have more customers and therefore, need more spectrum. This too, does not clear the test of fairness, and may not see the light of day. The Investment Hypothesis:After the collapse of Nazism, Germany has been defensive about its history for the last 60 years. That is human nature; the most diehard savers just now are no longer in Japan, but in the US and maybe, Greece. The cleanest, most careful policy that you will now see from this Govt, will be in the Telecom sector, trust me! If this is obvious to us, then we can move onto my next point. We will no longer see the hoarding of spectrum any more. Further, we will not see any policy from the Govt that pushes up the cost base of the entire industry, reducing it to a backdoor tax collection machine for the Govt. There will be some respect for the impregnably low tariffs achieved by this industry, and the fact that such a cost base fuels many other service and consumption industries. Now let us look at the competitive scenario. To repeat, MNP has come and gone, and the results have been predictable. The 3G launches have not seen aggressive behavior from anyone, nor are there any big expectations. Most big players will quietly use 3G to improve spectral efficiency, and absorb the licence costs within their existing profit streams. This is particularly true of Bharti, which will lead the price discounting, as it pays down the 3G and Zain debt. It is the only co that has been paying down debt, about $0.5 bn since my last update. The PSU telcos have too many problems of their own, with branding and service quality. They were never qualified for leadership, anyway. The battle really was between Bharti, Vodafone, Reliance and Idea. Reliance is now known to be facing Balance Sheet stress and is caught in a debt trap, operating above the acceptable Debt: EBIDTA ratio with big chunks of debt maturing by end of FY2012. It will have to place equity, which looks difficult, given that it has FCCBs which are not going to be converted. Even if it places Equity, it will be hugely dilutive, making it an unattractive investment even at these valuations. Bharti Again:Quietly, its EBIDTA run rate has gone back to its pre-Zain days. While the stock has stayed virtually at the same place, it has not suffered the washout that has plagued the broader market in the last 2 months. That is because there was very little expectation built into the price, given the overhang of the Zain valuations, the question marks over the turnaround + revenue/ profit growth at Zain, and the overhang of regulatory imposts embedded in the TRAI proposals. One by one, these concerns have been dealt with. Zain is back to revenue growth, the tariff wars have abated, EBIDTA is back at Rs.20,000 cr per annum (this time on a revenue base of ~Rs.60,000 cr), and the co’s Free Cashflows of Rs.10,000 cr are being used to pay down debt. While Reliance has Debt: Revenue = 1.5, with lower margins and much lesser Free Cashflow (Debt: FCF= 15 years), Bharti’s debt is at 1 time Revenue, and 5 years’ Free Cashflow. In about 2 years, the debt would have got very comfortable. At 6 times EBIDTA, the stock is among the cheapest Telecom stocks in the world, with an attractive positioning in the best growth markets of the world. It is perhaps the most competitive telco in the world, with its ‘minutes factory’ model, and is available at the valuations of a cyclical sugar/ textile co, which typically have Free Cashflow :: EBIDTA = 20% against 50-60% in case of Telecom. Using Warren Buffet’s principle, Bharti, therefore, is valued at about 60% of its Fair Value over 3 years, i.e. a Margin of Safety of 40%. Believe it or not, it falls into Charlie Munger’s set: if you buy a stock with a sufficient Margin of Safety, the best time to sell it is …..never!!! Using the Rule of 72, at 20% growth rate, Free Cashflow is doubling every 3 years. Remember, most of the Capex is over, and now the improvements in Network quality, tower population, solar panels for towers, etc have to be funded. Can you now imagine RCom being able to fund all that? In the next 2 years, we will see this industry consolidate, either by the fading away of some major players (the PSU telcos are prime candidates), or by their restructuring/ merger with other firms. The Joker in the pack?MukeshAmbani’s Reliance Industries, which could consolidate the industry, given what it already has (BWA) and an opportunistic acquisition or two, maybe even RCom. With the end of the regulatory overhang and the New Telecom Policy, one can expect that the end of the uncertainty over the Telecom sector will act as a trigger for a re-rating. You may not have to wait for the fundamentals to play out; just a clearing of the horizon may be enough.